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Abstract 
By presenting an overview of institutional theory, specifically the concepts of 
organizational fields, institutional pressures, and legitimacy, in addition to classical rhetoric, 
we have sought to highlight that there are links within the literature between the concepts of 
institutional theory and legitimacy, and also legitimacy and classical rhetoric. To date 
however, the three concepts – institutional pressures, legitimacy, and rhetoric – have not been 
explicitly linked. Through building on the current literature, and using the notion of 
legitimacy as the axis to connect institutional pressures with rhetoric, we argue that certain 
rhetorical devices may in fact be used to build and construct legitimacy in relation to the 
different institutional pressures an organization may face within a field. We believe that this 
preliminary framework may be useful to the field of CSR communication, whereby it may 
assist in constructing legitimate CSR communication in response to the various pressures an 
organization may face in relation to CSR. 
 
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, communication, institutional theory, 
institutional pressures, legitimacy, rhetoric 
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Introduction 
The last 15 years have seen an increase in the production of CSR reports (Basu & 
Palazzo, 2008; Bebbington, Larringa, & Moneva, 2008), both in terms of the number of 
organizations making disclosures and also in terms of the volume of information being 
published (Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002), however, this has also resulted in calls for 
greater transparency (Chen & Bouvain, 2009). This issue of transparency is a considerable 
issue in relation to CSR communication, given the rise in what scholars term the ‘Catch 22 of 
CSR communication’ (Burchell & Cook, 2008; Morsing, Schultz, & Nielsen, 2008). This 
refers to that fact that although there is an increased expectation for organizations to disclose 
information (Dawkins & Fraas, 2008; Morsing et al., 2008; Nielsen & Thomsen, 2007), 
stakeholders can often be highly sceptical of those organization seen to be communicating 
their CSR practices (Morsing et al., 2008; Tixier, 2003). 
Hence, the challenge for both scholars and practitioners is to create strategies for 
effective CSR communication that will minimize scepticism, whilst still continuing to convey 
the intrinsic motives behind organizations’ CSR practices (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; 
Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Given there is very little research to assist organizations and 
managers in how to approach the complexity of CSR communication (Morsing & Schultz, 
2006), and that calls have been made to address the “how” (Maon, Lindgreen, & Swaen, 
2010, p. 21) of CSR communication, a number of scholars are now focusing their attention on 
developing strategies for effective CSR communication. As a result, CSR research has begun 
to shift from understanding ‘why’ and ‘what’ to ‘how’ best to adopt strategies and practices 
that support CSR decisions within organizations (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Maon et al., 2010; 
Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). 
Upon reviewing the literature in relation to CSR communication, a number of 
frameworks were identified that have been created to assist in dealing with the complexities 
of CSR communication. However, a critical review of these frameworks revealed that whilst 
they do provide insights in relation to CSR communication, none of the current frameworks 
actually provide clear guidelines to assist organizations in effectively communicating their 
CSR activities. More specifically, whilst these frameworks offer insights, and may outline the 
key elements/areas that should be considered when communicating CSR practices, they 
provide little assistance on how best to address each of the elements. 
One perspective that may be useful to consider the ‘how’ of CSR communication is 
institutional theory. Institutional theory is a theoretical perspective that suggests organizations 
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are influenced by their institutional contexts (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008), 
which consist of socially constructed norms, myths, or rationales that guide organizational 
behaviour and action (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). With its microfoundations including Berger & 
Luckmann’s (1966) notion of social construction, and also Gidden’s (1984) structuration and 
social interaction (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), institutional theory is considered to be one of the 
dominant approaches used to understand organizations (Greenwood et al., 2008). We suggest 
that this theoretical perspective lends itself to considering how the interactions between 
business and society can impact CSR. Furthermore, it provides the ‘groundwork’ for 
considering strategies an organization may use to communicate its CSR practices based on 
these different interactions. 
This paper seeks to utilise institutional theory, and develop a conceptual framework 
that may be useful to the field of CSR communication. Using existing literature, this paper 
explores the notions of institutional pressures, legitimacy, and rhetoric, and notes that there 
are previously unexplored links between these constructs. Within this paper, we highlight 
these links, and suggest that this may form the basis of a framework which can aid in the 
construction of legitimate CSR communication in response to the myriad of pressures an 
organization may face in relation to CSR. 
In order to develop this conceptual framework, the paper is organized as follows. 
Firstly, we present an overview of institutional pressures. We then present literature on 
legitimacy, noting and critically reviewing how legitimacy and institutional pressures have 
been linked within extant literature. Following this, we introduce rhetoric, and outline how 
legitimacy and rhetoric have been linked within current literature. Finally, we bring the three 
elements – institutional pressures, legitimacy, and rhetoric – together to construct a 
preliminary framework, and conclude by noting that further research is being done to verify 
this framework.  
 
Institutional pressures 
According to institutional theory, organizations operating within the same field are 
faced by a number of institutional pressures. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) first proposed the 
idea of institutional pressures, after considering the question “Why is there such startling 
homogeneity of organization forms and practices?” (p. 148). In raising this question the 
authors noted that at the time, what was considered ‘modern’ organizational theory focused 
on the “diverse and differentiated world organizations” and sought to “explain variance 
among organizations in structure and behavior” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Hence, 
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they attempted to diverge from the population ecology view of organizations, and instead 
sought to explain homogeneity, rather than variation. In doing so, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) outlined three different pressures that could lead to isomorphism between 
organizations within the same organizational field: coercive, mimetic, and normative 
pressures.  
Coercive pressures result from entities that are external to the organization (Dingwerth 
& Pattberg, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2008; Matten & Moon, 2008; Milstein, Hart, & York, 
2002), and can include both formal and informal pressures that are exerted on organizations 
by other organizations upon which they are dependent (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Slack & 
Hinings, 1994). Typically, coercive pressures stem from political influence (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) or power relationships (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008), and may include 
government regulations or mandates (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hasse & Krücken, 2008; 
Milstein et al., 2002), or externally codified rules, norms, or laws (Matten & Moon, 2008). 
Although coercive pressures may be felt as force or persuasion, and are generally associated 
with explicit and direct impositions, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) do note that coercive 
pressures may be more subtle. Hence, coercive pressures may include both hard and soft 
regulation, and are generally adopted to avoid sanction (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2008). Finally, in conducting research on the diffusion of CSR across 
Europe, Matten and Moon (2008) highlight that coercive pressures that are relevant to CSR 
include compliance with environmental standards, such as the ISO 14000, and socially-
responsible investment indexes. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), uncertainty is also a powerful force that 
encourages imitation and can lead to isomorphism within an organizational field. Mimetic 
pressures generally occur when an organization faces uncertainty and, as a result, it tends to 
imitate or model other firms within the same field that are perceived to be successful 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2008; Milstein 
et al., 2002; Slack & Hinings, 1994). Given this, it has been suggested that mimicry stems 
from the ongoing observation of peers, competitors, and collaborators (Hasse & Krücken, 
2008), and although these pressures are generally ubiquitous, they may also be subtle 
(Haveman & David, 2008). Mimetic isomorphism has been likened to the ‘social fitness’ of 
the organization (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009), and may include adopting what is considered 
‘best practice’ within the organizational field (Matten & Moon, 2008). In relation to CSR, 
Matten and Moon (2008) suggest that mimetic pressures can result in the adoption of CSR 
reports. 
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Finally, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that normative pressures can also lead 
to isomorphism within an organizational field. Generally, normative pressures are considered 
as those pressures that pertain to what is widely considered a proper course of action or moral 
duty (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). 
However, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have linked normative pressures with professional 
norms (Dingweth & Pattberg, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2008; Slack & Hinings, 1994). As 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008) acknowledge however, it is possible that DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) merely intended to illustrate how particular norms, in this case, professional 
norms, might generate isomorphism within a field. Regardless of DiMaggio & Powell’s 
(1983) intention however, it has become widely rooted in organizational literature that 
normative pressures refer to professionalization. These normative pressures may include those 
norms that are both indirectly and directly set by the profession or through education 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and it is thought that organizations will incorporate normative 
pressures because they are motivated to respect social obligation (Greenwood et al., 2008). 
Finally, normative pressures can include industry standards and conventional wisdom which 
assist in creating clear boundaries and providing standardized conditions that are associated 
with a particular profession (Milstein et al., 2002). In relation to CSR, normative pressures 
can include professional associations putting pressure on the industry to adopt specific CSR 
practices (Matten & Moon, 2008). 
Building on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of the institutional 
pressures that can lead to isomorphism, as well as previous contributions to institutional 
theory, Scott (1995; 2001; 2008) outlined three ‘pillars’ that underlie institutional order: 
regulative, normative, and cognitive elements (Bansal & Penner, 2002; Child, Lu, & Tsai, 
2007; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002; Scott, 1995; 2001; 2008; Troast, 
Hoffman, Riley, & Bazerman, 2002).  
Similar to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of coercive pressures 
(Bansal & Penner, 2002; Scott, 1995), Scott’s regulative pillar, as the title suggests, represents 
rules that constrain behaviour, and is based on regulation and legal sanctions (Hoffman, 1999; 
Troast et al., 2002). Hence, it stresses rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning practices 
(Scott, 2008). Scholars have suggested that regulative elements that can impact on 
organizations include established rules, laws, sanctions, regulations, and contracts (Bansal & 
Penner, 2002; Scott, 1995). While Phillips and Malhotra (2008) suggest that Scott’s regulative 
pillar “emphasizes explicit regulatory processes” (p. 709), this has been slightly misconstrued. 
Instead, Scott (1995) notes that “scholars supporting this pillar are distinguished by the 
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prominence they give to explicit regulative processes” (p. 35), and although he suggests that 
“force and fear and expedience are central ingredients of the regulative pillar” (p. 36), he does 
state that the rules underpinning this pillar may be “informal mores or formal rules and laws” 
(p. 36).  To summarize Scott’s regulative pillar, the basis of compliance is expedience, the 
mechanism is coercive, and the indicators are rules, laws, and sanctions (Phillips & Malhotra, 
2008; Scott, 1995). 
Scott’s (1995; 2001; 2008) normative pillar differs slightly from DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of normative pressures, and instead considers the norms, 
values, and beliefs of the constituents which provide stability to social order and facilitate 
communication and actions (Bansal & Penner, 2002; Scott, 1995). Hence, emphasis is placed 
on the normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life (Scott, 1995). As Scott (1995) suggests, normative rules confer rights as well as 
responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as well as mandates, and can include 
rules-of-thumb, standard operating procedures, occupational standards, and educational 
curricula, certifications, and accreditation (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1995). These normative 
aspects stem from social obligations, which may include professionalization within an 
organizational field (Hoffman, 1999; Troast et al., 2002), and hence in this aspect, it is similar 
to DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of normative pressures. Furthermore, an 
organization will generally comply with them because it feels that they are a moral or ethical 
obligation (Hoffman, 1999). Hence, the basis of compliance which underlies the normative 
pillar is social obligation, the mechanisms are normative, and the indicators include 
certification and accreditation (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Scott, 1995). 
Finally, while the regulative and normative pillars operate at the field and 
organizational level, Scott’s cognitive pillar operates at the individual level. According to 
Scott (1995), cognitive elements of institutions include the “rule that constitute the nature of 
reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (p. 40). In other words, cognitive 
aspects of institutions are socially constructed assumptions of reality, and it is these cognitive 
aspects that emphasize the taken-for-granted beliefs that organizations will conform to 
(Bansal & Penner, 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Troast et al., 2002; Zilber, 2006). Scott (1995) has 
suggested that the mechanism which most clearly captures the cognitive dimension of 
isomorphic pressures is imitation, hence this pillar is closely associated with DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) mimetic pressures. It should be noted however that some scholars have 
suggested that organizations will abide by cognitive aspects of institutions without conscious 
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thought (Hoffman, 1999; Zucker, 1983), and as such, it has been argued that this pillar works 
with “no questions asked and without deviation” (Hirsch, 1997; p. 1710).  
Recently, Schultz and Wehmeier (2010) considered the institutionalization of CSR, 
and built upon Campbell’s (2007) eight propositions which considered the institutional 
reasons why organizations adopt socially responsible behaviours. In doing so, they outlined a 
total of four institutional pressures, which are vastly similar to both DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) and Scott’s (1995) conceptualization of institutional pressures: competition/mimetic, 
regulative, professional/normative, and public pressures. Here, it should noted that although 
Schultz and Wehmeier (2010) highlighted these four pressures, they offered little in the way 
of justification as to why they incorporated four pressures, rather than the three suggested by 
both Scott (1995) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), nor did they outline how their four 
pressures correspond to both DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) and Scott’s (1995) 
conceptualizations. In relation to CSR, we see the value of considering all four pressures 
noted by Schultz and Wehmeier (2010), and in the following sections, we build on DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), Scott (1995), and Schultz and Wehmeier (2010) by explain each of the 
pressures, as they provide the basis of our framework for communicating CSR. 
 
Competitive pressures 
Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) competitive or mimetic pressure is similar to 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) mimetic pressure, and also, somewhat loosely, to Scott’s 
(1995) cognitive pillar, in that it involves imitating other organizations who are perceived to 
be successful when faced with uncertainty. Although some have suggested that this pressure 
works on a “no questions asked” basis (Hirsch, 1997. p. 1710), and hence may appear as 
‘mere’ copying, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) have emphasized that “practical consciousness 
involves energy, effort, and reflection” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 279). Hence, whilst 
Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) view of mimetic pressures suggests that organizations will 
imitate others within the field without knowing whether or why this strategy they are 
imitating is successful, our view on competitive pressures follows the notion that there is still 
a level of thought involved when responding to this pressure and incorporating these 
practices. 
 
Regulative pressures 
This pressure is explicitly linked to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive pressure, 
as well as Scott’s (1995) regulative pillar, in that organizations are forced to comply with the 
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regulations, laws, and externally codified rules and norms. In this sense, regulative pressures 
can include both hard and soft regulation. 
 
Professional pressures 
Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) notion of professional/normative pressures 
corresponds most closely to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of normative 
pressures, which includes professional norms that are set both indirectly and directly through 
professional associations and education. It can also be likened to Scott’s (1995) view that 
normative pressures can include mandates, rules-of-thumb, standard operating procedures, 
occupational standards, educations curricula, certifications, and accreditation. 
 
Public pressures 
Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) conceptualization of public pressures refers to the 
pressures a public may put on an organization to comply with socially constructed norms, 
which the organization in turn responds to in order to appear as a ‘moral’ organization. 
According to Schultz and Wehmeier (2010), the media is a key player in this public pressure, 
as public expectations can be negotiated and debated through the media. Although this 
pressure is not explicitly linked to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of 
institutional pressures, or to Scott’s (1995) three pillars, one can argue that it is implied.  
In considering Scott’s (1995) normative pillar, he suggests that this considers the 
norms, values, and beliefs of constituents and that normative rules also confer responsibilities 
and duties. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that organizations will generally comply 
with normative pressures because they feel that they have a moral or ethical obligation to do 
so (Hoffman, 1999), and that the basis of compliance which underlies the normative pillar is 
social obligation (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Scott, 1995). 
This pressure also have some similarities to the subtleties of Scott’s (1995) cognitive 
pillar, in that Scott suggests that cognitive elements of institutions include the “rules that 
constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 1995, 
p. 40). This suggests that cognitive aspects of institutions are socially constructed assumptions 
of reality that organizations will conform to (Bansal & Penner, 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Troast 
et al., 2002), which is similar to Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) conceptualization of public 
pressures. Here it should be noted that whilst Schultz and Wehmeier (2010, p.15) clearly 
suggest that public pressures are cognitive, we would like to acknowledge that the terms 
public and cognitive may be contradictory, whereby public suggests a societal view, and 
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cognitive implies an individual view. Hence, we follow the view that public pressures are 
those that are socially constructed by society within the public sphere. 
Finally, in considering the different constituents that may comprise a field, it has been 
suggested that special interest groups, consumers, and the general public can be included as 
constituents (Hoffman, 1999). Given scholars have suggested that constituents are those who 
can impose pressure on, or can influence an organization and its practices (Hoffman, 1999; 
Zilber, 2006), the inclusion of this fourth pressure can be deemed appropriate. 
Table 2 summarizes the four institutional pressures, and also notes the constituents 
that are responsible for imposing these pressures upon an organization.  
 
Table 1. Four institutional pressures 
Institutional pressure Constituents  
Competitive 
pressures 
Occurs when the organization faces uncertainty, and as a result, 
imitates others in the field which are perceived to be successful, 
without actually knowing whether or why this strategy may be 
successful. This may include adopting the same rating systems, 
guidelines, financial indexed and models as other organizations 
within the field. 
e.g. Critical exchange 
partners, suppliers, 
industry 
Regulative 
pressures 
 
Occurs when an organization is forced to comply with the law, and 
includes regulations, legal sanctions, laws, contracts, and externally 
codified rules and norms.  
e.g. Government, 
regulatory agencies 
Professional 
pressures 
 
Occurs when the organization complies with professional norms, 
such as industry standards, rules of thumb, operating procedures, 
certifications, accreditations, and educational curricula. 
e.g. Professional &  
trade associations, 
education 
Public 
pressures 
 
Occurs when the organization faces public pressure to comply with 
socially constructed norms, which are often negotiated and debated 
between the organization and the media. 
e.g. Consumers, special 
interest groups, general 
public 
Source: Developed by authors (with reference to Bansal & Penner, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;  Dingwerth 
& Pattberg, 2009; Hoffman, 1999; Matten & Moon, 2008; Milstein et al., 2002; Scott, 1995; 2001; 2008; Schultz 
& Wehmeier, 2010; Slack & Hinings, 1994; Troast et al., 2002) 
 
Legitimacy 
According to institutional theory, the main reason why organizations incorporate 
institutional pressures is in order to appear legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Following 
Suchman (1995), legitimacy can be defined as a “generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). Hence, legitimacy is subjective, 
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whereby it is socially constructed, and will therefore reflect an alignment between the 
practices of the organization and the shared beliefs of a social group or social actors (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).  
An institutional theory perspective of legitimacy suggests that norms, myths, or 
rationales underpin legitimacy and guide organizational action and practices (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Furthermore, this perspective suggests that these rationales may become 
‘institutionalized’, whereby they take on rule-like status in social thought and action (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
A number of scholars have suggested that organizations are required to comply with 
rationales or expectations, such as taken-for-granted assumptions, public opinion, or the law 
in order to be considered legitimate (Deegan, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). In other words, the organizations will incorporate or try to incorporate the 
various institutional pressures it faces from the field in which it operates. 
 The notion of legitimacy suggests that organizations seek to ensure they act, or appear 
to act, within the boundaries or rationales of the societies in which they operate (Deegan et 
al., 2002). As such, in order to comply with these expectations of legitimacy, and hence be 
considered legitimate, an organization must be “perceived to be pursuing socially acceptable 
goals in a socially acceptable manner” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 117). Therefore, an 
organization, along with its practices, can be perceived as legitimate by complying with social 
norms, values, and expectations, or by adopting and maintaining widely used and accepted 
practices or rationales (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Elsbach, 1994; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1996; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). In other words, it can be 
suggested that organizations respond to institutional pressures that stem from within the 
organizational field in order to pursue legitimate. Hence, it has been suggested that there is a 
logical connection between institutional pressures and legitimacy (Haveman & David, 2008). 
Although not the first scholar to conceptualize different dimensions of legitimacy, 
Suchman’s (1995) three dimensions are perhaps the most widely recognized and cited. 
Suchman (1995) outlines three types of legitimacy – pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy – which are broadly similar to Scott’s three dimensions of legitimacy – regulative, 
normative, and cognitive legitimacy. These three dimensions of legitimacy are said to “map 
neatly onto the three processes [pressures] driving isomorphism” (Haveman & David, 2008, 
p. 580). Through referencing Scott (2001), Haveman and David (2008) suggest that cognitive 
legitimacy maps onto mimetic pressures, regulative legitimacy onto coercive pressures, and 
normative legitimacy onto normative pressures. It should be noted however, that there is some 
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contention surrounding these links. The three dimensions of legitimacy and their respective 
links to the institutional pressures are discussed below. 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
According to Suchman (1995), pragmatic legitimacy “rests on the self-interested 
calculations of an organizations’ most immediate audiences” (p. 578) and involves direct 
exchanges between an organization and its audiences.  Pragmatic legitimacy can also involve 
broader political, economic, or social interdependencies (Suchman, 1995). In its most basic 
sense, pragmatic legitimacy may be accorded if the organization’s actions align with the 
expected value of that action to a particular set of constituents (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Suchman, 1995), yet may also stem from an organization’s ability to demonstrate that it is 
responsive to its constituents’ larger interests (Suchman, 1995). For example, the organization 
may be accorded pragmatic legitimacy if it adopts constituents’ standards of performance as 
its own. Hence, pragmatic legitimacy is generally associated with exchange, benefit and 
influence effects, or essentially, whether the organization’s actions are congruent with that 
particular constituent’s views (Suchman, 1995). For this reason, pragmatic legitimacy is often 
linked with coercive or regulatory pressures (Haveman & David, 2008).  
 
Moral legitimacy 
Whilst pragmatic legitimacy is said to rest of the judgements about whether a given 
activity benefits the evaluator, moral legitimacy rests on judgements about whether the 
activity is the right thing to do (Suchman, 1995). Hence, moral legitimacy “reflects a positive 
normative evaluation of the organization and its activities” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579) and may 
be accorded if the audience deems that the activity promotes social welfare, or is aligned with 
their socially constructed values system. The institutional literature has often referred to moral 
legitimacy as normative legitimacy, which according to Suchman (1995), ignores the 
subtleties of this type of legitimacy. As Suchman (1995) suggests, normative legitimacy has 
often been used to distinguish between normative and cognitive behavioural mechanisms, 
however in some literatures, the term ‘normative’ refers to all cultural regulatory processes, 
not just those involving a conscious assessment of right or wrong. In contrast, the use of the 
term ‘moral’ implies a conscious assessment of right or wrong, hence moral legitimacy 
involves a conscious assessment.  
Furthermore, as Deephouse and Suchman (2008) have posited, in contemporary 
institutional literature moral or normative legitimacy has often been equated with DiMaggio 
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and Powell’s (1983) concept of normative pressures. Whilst normative legitimacy is 
associated with shared norms or values, normative isomorphic pressures are congruent with 
the particular ethics and views of formal professions, hence the term normative or moral 
legitimacy is often incorrectly marginalized or restricted to professional endorsement. Given 
this, calls have been made to acknowledge the differences between the two views, whereby 
the term ‘professional legitimacy’ should be used to refer to legitimacy conferred by 
professional endorsement on any grounds, and ‘normative legitimacy’ or ‘moral legitimacy’ 
should refer to legitimacy conferred by any audience on normative grounds (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008). As noted earlier, this would involve a conscious assessment. 
 
Cognitive legitimacy 
Whilst pragmatic and moral legitimacy is associated with active support, or a 
conscious assessment, cognitive legitimacy generally involves passive support (Suchman, 
1995). As such, this type of legitimacy may involve either affirmative backing for the 
organizations, or a mere acceptance as necessary or inevitable based on some type of taken-
for-granted cultural account. Scholars have generally associated cognitive legitimacy with 
mimetic isomorphism (Haveman & David, 2008: Strang & Soule, 1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983), arguing that if numerous organizations adopt a practice, the more widespread its 
acceptance and the greater its legitimacy.  This may also be as a result of mimetic pressures 
being associated with ‘blind copying’. However, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) have 
claimed that DiMaggio (1995) has “expressed caution about the facile assumption that 
cognitive legitimacy and mimetic isomorphism necessarily go hand in hand” (p. 70), a fact 
that few scholars have acknowledged. Whilst DiMaggio’s (1995) article does not explicitly 
state this concern, a number of scholars (see Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Green, 2004; Greenwood, 
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) have argued that cognitive legitimacy is produced in the latter 
stages of the institutionalization process, and generally after pragmatic and moral legitimacy 
have been achieved (Green, 2004; Greenwood et al., 2002).  
Table 3 illustrates how these dimensions of legitimacy correlate to the four 
institutional pressures informing our conceptual framework. 
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Table 2. Institutional pressures and legitimacy 
Institutional pressure Legitimacy 
Competitive pressures 
 
Generally, this has been associated with cognitive legitimacy, 
given mimetic pressures may be associated with ‘best practice’, 
hence implying that the action has become taken-for granted. 
However scholars have suggested that the link between mimetic 
pressures and cognitive legitimacy may not be accurate. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that mimetic pressures can also entail, 
particularly in the early stages of a new practice, ‘blind copying’ 
without actually knowing of why the practice should be 
implemented. Given this, it is unclear what type of legitimacy is 
associated with mimetic pressures. 
Yet to be 
clarified 
Regulative pressures This type of pressure is associated with pragmatic legitimacy, 
given pragmatic legitimacy stems from an organization’s ability to 
demonstrate that it is responsive to its constituents’ larger interests 
(Suchman, 1995). 
Pragmatic 
legitimacy 
Professional pressures 
 
Although often related to normative or moral legitimacy, 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008) have suggested that this 
marginalizes and restricts the notion of normative legitimacy. 
Hence, they have suggested that professional legitimacy should be 
used to refer to legitimacy conferred by professional endorsement 
on any grounds (hence, this could be accorded on either normative 
or pragmatic grounds, but perhaps more likely pragmatic grounds, 
given pragmatic legitimacy may be accorded if an organization 
adopts a constituent’s standards of performance as its own). 
Professional 
legitimacy 
Public pressures 
 
Given Schultz & Wehmeier (2010) have clearly linked the term 
‘cognitive’ with their notion of public pressures, this pressure may 
seem to imply an association with cognitive legitimacy. However, 
cognitive legitimacy is generally associated with taken-for-
grantedness (Suchman, 1995) and is thought to be achieved after 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy have been achieved. Hence, 
following the description of this type of pressure outlined in 
earlier, one would associated this type of pressure with moral 
legitimacy, whereby the public would accord legitimacy based on 
a conscious assessment as to whether the organization’s practices 
and actions are in accord with their own socially constructed 
values system. 
Moral 
legitimacy 
Source: Developed by authors 
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Rhetoric 
It has been suggested that through rhetoric, actors shape the legitimacy of practices by 
making persuasive arguments that justify and rationalize these practices (Green, 2004; Green, 
Li, & Nohria, 2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In its most basic sense, rhetoric is used in 
order to “influence an audience to accept an idea, and then to act in a manner consistent with 
that idea” (Herrick, 2009, p. 13). This is supported by Kennedy (2007), who suggests that 
rhetoric refers to a “form of mental or emotional energy imparted to a communication” in 
order to impact a situation based on the rhetor’s intentions (p. 7). Put simply, rhetoric is an 
authoritative method of persuading people (Abizadeh, 2002; Burke, 1960), whereby a rhetor 
seeks to alter an audience’s view so that it is congruent with that rhetor’s view. Essentially, it 
is concerned with making a judgment (Aristotle, trans. 2007; Burke, 1982; Herrick, 2009), 
and can also be considered as verbal communication used by specific actors to create desire 
beliefs and impression (Wæraas & Ihlen, 2009).  
As Green et al. (2009) outline however, whilst there is a growing interest in the use of 
rhetorical theory in organizations studies (see for example Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 
2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Oakes, Townley, & 
Cooper, 1998), rhetorical theory can be quite broad and complex. Literature does show, 
however, that most scholars using rhetoric theory to study organizations have focus on two 
domains: classical rhetoric and new rhetoric (Green et al., 2009). Whilst new rhetoric focuses 
on the audience of the communication, and also the social aspects of communication, classical 
rhetoric emphasizes what the rhetor communicates (Green et al., 2009). Given our aim is to 
develop a framework which considers how and what organizations communicate in relation to 
their CSR practices, classical rhetoric will be used, and is the focus of this section. 
 
Classical rhetoric 
In order to persuade an audience through the use of arguments and appeals, Aristotle 
saw the art of rhetoric as combining a logical study (logos), a psychological study (pathos), 
and a sociology study (ethos) (Herrick, 2009). In other words, logos, pathos, and ethos should 
be utilized in order to provide the rhetor with sources of proof through arguments and appeals, 
hence permitting persuasiveness (Abizadeh, 2002; Burke, 1982; Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 
1987; Richards, 2008; Robinson, 2006; Self, 1979).  
Aristotle considered three modes of persuasion, otherwise known as pisteis or artistic 
proofs – logos, ethos, and pathos (Abizadeh, 2002; Aristotle, trans. 2007; Heath, 2009; 
Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 1987; Richards, 2008). These modes were an adaptation from Plato’s 
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suggestion of fitting the speech to the audience (Kennedy, 2007), and were derived from the 
three factors which should be apparent in any speech: (a) presenting the view that the speaker 
is a ‘trustworthy’ character, (b) creating a logical argument or reasoning through the text, and 
(c) putting the audience in a certain frame by enabling the speaker, text, or a combination of 
the two to arouse the audience’s emotions (Abizadeh, 2002; Aristotle, trans. 1954; Aristotle, 
trans. 2007; Burke, 1969; Burke, 1982; Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 1987; Richards, 2008; 
Robinson, 2006; Self, 1979). This is perhaps best summarised by Aristotle (trans. 1954) when 
he elaborates on the three available means of effecting persuasion: 
The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, 
(2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to 
understand the emotions – that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes 
and the way in which they are excited (p. 25). 
These three available modes of effecting persuasion became known as: 
• pathos – considering the emotions of those in the audience in order to induce them to 
make the judgement desired; 
• logos – showing the probability of what is said through using a logical and rational 
argument; and 
• ethos – projecting that the speaker as trustworthy (Abizadeh, 2002; Aristotle, trans. 
1954; Aristotle, trans. 2007; Burke, 1982; Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 1987; Richards, 
2008; Robinson, 2006; Self, 1979).  
Although the three modes of persuasion are distinguishable, many scholars argue that 
logos, ethos, and pathos are invariably interrelated, and to an extent, interdependent when 
used in practice (Abizadeh, 2002; Nichols, 1987; Robinson, 2006; Wæraas & Ihlen, 2009). 
Each of these modes of persuasion or rhetorical devices is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Pathos: Pathos appeals generally involve putting the audience in the right frame of mind 
(Aristotle, as cited in Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 1987). Hence, this term is associated with 
emotions, whereby it is often used to refer to the affective or emotional appeals, such as fear 
or greed, that are utilized in order to give persuasive messages the power to move an audience 
into action (Herrick, 2009; Green, 2004; Robinson 2006; Self, 1979; Wæraas & Ihlen, 2009). 
Aristotle’s view of pathos however, refers to the way in which persuasion may come through 
the audience when the speaker is able to stir emotions (Aristotle, trans. 1954; Aristotle, trans. 
2007). In other words, persuasion can be achieved when the speaker is able to manipulate or 
connect with the audience’s emotions in order to affect the judgement of that audience 
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(Herrick, 2009; Green, 2004). Although this may imply emotions as being irrational, it is 
important to note that Aristotle viewed emotions as rational responses to certain 
circumstances and arguments (Herrick, 2009). Hence, emotions should not be considered as 
irrational responses which can impact on one’s ability to form a rational decision. 
Given pathos appeals are said to be “appeals to an audience’s self interests” (Green, 
2004, p. 659), Green (2004) has suggested that pathos appeals may assist in constructing and 
building pragmatic legitimacy. However, it should be noted that whilst pathos pleas are 
initially persuasive, they are generally unable to sustain the limited attention of actors. For 
this reason, practices associated with emotional appeals are said to have “transient persuasive 
power that may exhibit fadlike tendencies” (Green, 2004, p. 659). 
 
Logos: According to Herrick (2009), logos is a term with many nuances of meaning. 
In its Greek form, logos typically means “what is said” (Aristotle, trans. 2007, p. 38), but can 
also simply mean a word or the words of a document or speech (Aristotle, trans. 2007; 
Herrick, 2009). In addition to this, the term logos can refer to the thoughts expressed through 
words, as well as the reason or argument which is inherent in a speech or document 
(Abizadeh, 2002; Aristotle, trans. 2007; Herrick, 2009; Richards, 2008). Logos was 
considered as a distinctly human characteristic, one that separated humans from animals, and 
for this reason, logos was also utilized to suggest intellect or rationality (Herrick, 2009). 
As both Aristotle (trans. 1954) and Nichols (1987) have suggested, logos can have a 
significant impact on persuasion if the speech itself can be proved to be truth, or if the 
apparent truth can be deduced through created a persuasive, logical argument (Aristotle, trans, 
1954; Nichols, 1987). This is supported in Kennedy’s translation of Aristotle (trans. 2007), 
whereby it is suggested that persuasion occurs through the arguments, otherwise known as 
logoi (Abizadeh; 2002; Aristotle, trans. 2007), when the truth or apparent truth is illustrated to 
the audience. 
As a study, logos is closely related to the study of logic, and considers making 
inferences or reasoning based on an argument or account, or developing a clear and logical 
explanation (Aristotle, trans. 2007; Herrick, 2009; Nichols, 1987; Robinson, 2006). Hence, 
logos can be related to the concept of an argument, whereby an argument “is simply reasoning 
made public with the goal of influencing an audience” (Herrick, 2009, p.13), and can only be 
made when the conclusion drawn is supported by reasons (Herrick, 2009). Given this, it has 
been suggested that logos appeals are those that involve the use of reasoning to construct 
logically valid arguments and can include appeals to facts, numbers, examples, and statistics 
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(Wæraas & Ihlen, 2009). According to Green (2004) “logos pleas justify action by appealing 
to the desire for efficient/effective action” (p. 659), and essentially involve developing 
reasoning from arguments in order to assist with practical decision making. For this reason, it 
has been suggested that logos pleas, like pathos appeals, can help build pragmatic legitimacy 
(Green, 2004). 
Here, it should be noted that although appeals to logic are able to sustain their 
persuasiveness, unlike passionate or pathos pleas that tend to dissipate quickly, logos 
justifications are generally slower at getting the attention of actors’ attention, largely because 
they often require methodological calculation of means and ends (Green, 2004; Simon, 1945). 
Furthermore, although logos pleas have a slower persuasive force than pathos appeals, their 
focus on individual interests gives them a faster effect on persuasion than ethos appeals. In 
saying this however, the social acceptance, and thus sustainability are considered to be less 
than that of ethos appeals (Green, 2004). 
 
Ethos: Ethos is the Greek term used to refer to the moral character of the speaker 
(Aristotle, trans. 2007; Nichols, 1987; Robinson, 2006; Self, 1979), whereby the 
persuasiveness rests with the speaker’s personal character or trustworthiness, as well as their 
ability to appear credible (Aristotle, trans. 1954; Herrick, 2009; Robinson, 2006; Wæraas & 
Ihlen, 2009). To further illustrate this point, Aristotle (trans. 2007) argues that “we believe 
fair minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in 
general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” 
(p. 38). For this reason, ethos can only be persuasive when the speaker successfully illustrates 
that they are worthy of such credence. 
Given Aristotle argued that people are more likely to believe ‘fair minded people’, 
Aristotle held that of the three modes of persuasion, ethos could potentially be considered as 
the most effective means of persuasion that a person possesses (Aristotle, trans. 1954; 
Herrick, 2009; Green, 2004; Robinson, 2006; Self, 1979). To illustrate this point, Herrick 
(2009) argues that if an audience is convinced that a speaker is knowledgeable, trustworthy, 
and has the audience’s best interests at heart, then the audience would be more likely to accept 
what the speaker is saying as the truth. It must be noted however, that Aristotle (trans. 1954) 
held the view that persuasion achieved through ethos should be done so based on what the 
speaker says, not through any judgement passed on the person’s character before they begin 
to speak. In other words, in theory, the morality or trustworthiness of the person should not be 
based on the person’s prior reputation with the audience (Herrick, 2009).  
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In essence, ethos appeals justify action by appealing to socially accepted norms and 
mores. As such, ethos appeals are said to produce moral legitimacy (Green, 2004), which, as 
outlined previously, “rests not on judgements about whether a given activity benefits the 
evaluator, but rather on judgements about whether the activity is the ‘right thing to do’” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 579). Unlike pathos and logos justifications which emphasize individual 
concerns and interests, ethos appeals focus on social and collective interests. Hence, given 
ethos appeals typically require more complex cognitive processing than direct appeals to 
individual interests, these appeals generally take longer to achieve persuasive effects than 
logos or pathos appeals (Green, 2004). Here, it should be noted that whilst ethos appeals may 
prolong the time required to have persuasive effects, their persuasive ability can generally be 
sustained over a period of time, to a point where they “become synonymous with what is right 
and good” (Green, 2004, p. 660).  
Finally, in considering the diffusion of managerial practices, Green (2004) noted that 
whilst pathos appeals are generally used at the beginning of the diffusion process, whereby 
they are useful at gaining attention and inducing a willingness to act, logos pleas are 
introduced towards the middle of the diffusion process. Finally, ethos appeals are generally 
used at the latter stages of diffusion, when the practice has become deeply entrenched and 
deeply entrenched (Green, 2004). Once the practice has become ‘taken-for-granted’, cognitive 
legitimacy may be produced. 
 
Rhetoric and CSR 
According to Ihlen (2011), the field of rhetoric can be highly useful for researchers to 
focus on and understand the specific textual strategies used by organizations when they 
communicate about their CSR practices. To date however, the literature on CSR rhetoric is 
relatively meagre, though there are a few that should be mentioned. 
Robert L Heath, a prominent scholar in public relations, is a strong advocate linking 
rhetoric and public relations, and has made a number of explicit and implicit references to 
CSR (Ihlen, 2011). In some of his more recent work, Heath (2009) stated: 
 “Rhetoric is the rationale for effective discourse. It consists of a well-established body of 
critical principles and strategic guide lines regarding how messages need to be proved, 
structured, framed, and worded. It is interested in how each message needs to be designed to 
be informative and persuasive. Because rhetorical theory arises out of disputes and 
differences of opinions, it offers guidelines on how people negotiate differences and work 
together in collaborative decision making. It informs, creates divisions, and bridges 
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divisions. It advocates, convinces, and motivates. It motivates people to make one choice in 
preference to another (p. 23). 
Although this statement was in the context of the relevance of rhetoric to public 
relations, there is considerable overlap with the relevance to CSR communication. As Heath 
(2009) notes, rhetoric is the rationale for effective discourse, and as noted in the introduction 
of this article, a key challenge for organizations communicating their CSR practices/strategies 
is how to communicate them in a manner which is effect and minimizes scepticism. Hence, 
CSR communication may benefit by adopting rhetorical devices, particularly given scholars 
have suggested that there is a link between rhetoric and legitimacy (Green, 2004; Green et al., 
2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
In relation to CSR communication specifically, Øyvind Ihlen had conducted a number 
of studies linking rhetoric and CSR communication. Of particular interest is Wæraas and 
Ihlen’s (2009) study which linked institutional theory, rhetoric, and CSR communication. 
This study, which focused primarily on the rhetorical device of ethos, investigated the rhetoric 
used in ceremonies about the organization’s environmental practices (Wæraas & Ihlen, 2009). 
The same year, Ihlen (2009) expanded on this study, illustrating the links between public 
relations and CSR, and demonstrated how organizational rhetors use CSR texts to build 
environmental ethos. 
Although scholars have increasingly begun to adopt rhetorical theory in organizational 
studies (Green et al., 2009), there are limited studies linking rhetoric and CSR 
communication, and also linking rhetoric, CSR communication, and institutional theory. 
However, as Ihlen (2011) suggests, rhetoric is a useful starting point for those that wish to 
charter the terrain of textual CSR strategies, and can aid in developing an understanding as to 
how and why organizations communicate about CSR in the way that they do. To date 
however, the research that has linked CSR communication and rhetoric has been limited to 
the study of ethos, and has not considered how claims about CSR practices are supported by 
ethos, logos, and/or pathos (Ihlen, 2011).  
 
The legitimacy axis 
Building on the extant literature, we believe legitimacy may serve as an axis to link 
institutional theory and rhetoric. To date, this connection has not been established within the 
literature, and we believe that these links may form the basis of a conceptual framework 
which can indicate communication strategies in relation to institutional pressures. Given there 
is a need to consider the ‘how’ of CSR communication (Maon et al., 2010), this framework 
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may be particularly beneficial to the field of CSR communication, whereby it highlights how 
organizations should respond to the various pressures, whether it be regulative, professional, 
competitive, or public, in relation to CSR. 
Table 4 highlights the links between the four institutional pressures, the type of 
legitimacy, and the type of rhetorical device one would expect to see based on the links to 
legitimacy that have been noted.  
 
Table 3. Linking institutional pressures, legitimacy, and rhetorical devices 
Institutional pressure Legitimacy Rhetorical device 
Competitive pressures To be clarified To be determined 
Regulative pressures Pragmatic legitimacy Logos or pathos 
Professional pressures Professional legitimacy To be determined 
Public pressures Moral legitimacy Ethos 
Source: Developed by authors 
 
As noted earlier, this framework is still very much conceptual, and it should be noted 
that this links eluded to within the literature have not been explored in great detail. 
Furthermore, as Table 4 indicates, there are a number of gaps in the current literature linking 
the institutional pressures with legitimacy and rhetoric. Given scholars have suggested that 
competitive or mimetic pressures should not be associated with cognitive legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), it is unclear what type of legitimacy may be accorded to this 
pressure. As a result, it is also unclear as to the type of rhetorical device one would expect to 
see being used to build legitimacy in relation to this institutional pressure. Furthermore, the 
term professional legitimacy is a relatively new term (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), and 
hence, no previous literature has established the type of rhetorical device that may be used to 
build or construct professional legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
As this paper has highlighted, institutional theory has traditionally only recognised 
three institutional pressures, however, in following Schultz and Wehmeier (2010), we 
advocate a total of four institutional pressures – competitive, regulative, professional and 
public. We have attempted to extend Schultz and Wehmeier’s articulation of these pressures, 
and would suggest that the notion of institutional pressures provides a view which may enable 
researchers to consider how the interactions between business and society can impact on CSR 
and CSR communication.  
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This paper has also considered the extant literature on legitimacy and noted that that 
whilst scholars have generally accepted three different types of legitimacy, there has been a 
push to consider an additional type of legitimacy, bringing the total to four types of legitimacy 
– pragmatic, normative, professional, and cognitive. In reviewing the literature, we also 
highlighted that scholars have sought to associate the different types of legitimacy with 
institutional pressures. We have adapted these associations to tie in with the four institutional 
pressures noted in this paper, noting that regulative pressures may be linked to pragmatic 
legitimacy, professional pressures to professional legitimacy, and also public pressures to 
moral legitimacy. Because there is contention in the literature surrounding the link that has 
previously been suggested between mimetic pressures and cognitive legitimacy, future 
research is require to establish the type of legitimacy that would correspond to what we have 
termed competitive pressures. 
To develop a framework that could illustrate how interactions between business and 
society can influence CSR communication, we also considered rhetoric, and used extant 
literature to highlight the links between rhetoric and legitimacy. Using legitimacy as an axis, 
our conceptual framework suggests that ethos may be used to respond to public pressures, and 
either logos or pathos in relation to regulative pressures. Given scholars have yet to agree on 
the type of legitimacy relating to competitive pressures, it is still unclear what type of rhetoric 
may be used to respond to competitive pressures. Additionally, given the term professional 
legitimacy is a relatively new term, it also remains unclear what type of rhetoric may be 
associated with this type of legitimacy, and hence be used to respond to professional 
pressures.  
Given that there are still gaps within this conceptual framework, and the fact that the 
links eluded to within the literature, particularly those between legitimacy and rhetoric, have 
not been explored in great detail, future research is needed. At present, the authors are 
currently using a qualitative, rhetorical approach to explore these links and address the gaps 
noted in Table 4 in relation to CSR communication, and are studying a number of 
organizations within the same, and also differing, organizational fields.  
By considering the CSR communication of a number of organizations within the same 
and also differing organizational fields, this study will seek to explore how and why, and 
more importantly, whether institutional pressures result in similar CSR communication 
strategies both within and across different organizations fields. To do this, this study will 
adopt a rhetorical approach to analyze CSR communication, and will consider what rhetorical 
devices – in terms of pathos, logos, and ethos – are used by organizations when 
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communicating their CSR strategies. By investigating what rhetorical devices are used by 
organizations when responding to the four different institutional pressures proposed in this 
paper – competitive, regulative, professional, and public – from within an organizational field, 
it is anticipated that the research currently being undertaken will outline what strategies 
organizations can use to communicate their CSR practices in order to pursue legitimacy in 
relation to certain pressures. In doing so, this research seeks to consider the interactions 
between business and society in relation to CSR communication, and create an applied 
framework that addresses the ‘how’ of CSR communication.  
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